ocj  3??51 31 


WAR     INFORMATION     SERIES 


No.  8 


September,    1  9  i  7 


AMERICAN  INTEREST  IN 

POPULAR  GOVERNMENT 

ABROAD 


By 


^ 


EVARTS   B.  GREENE 

PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY.  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  *^^  -"^ 


f^i 


C.         A 
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uUS. 


Published  by  COMMITTEE  OnWuBLIC  INFORMATION.  Washington.  D.  C. 


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AMERICAN  INTEREST  IN  POPULAR  GOV- 
ERNMENT ABROAD. 

By  EvARTS  B.  Greene,  Professor  of  History,  University  of 

Illinois. 

In  his  memorable  message  to  Coi^igress  of  April  2,  1917, 
President  Wilson,  after  describing  at  some  length  the  recent 
proceedings  of  the  German  Government,  declared  that  "in 
the  presence  of  its  organized  power,  always  lying  in  wait 
to  accomplish  we  know  not  what  purpose,  there  can  be  no 
assured  security  for  the  democratic  governments  of  the 
world."  "We  are  glad,"  he  continues,  "to  fight  thus  for 
the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its 
peoples,  the  German  peoples  included ;  for  the  rights  of 
nations,  great  and  small,  and  the  privilege  of  men  every- 
where to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience.  The 
world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy;  its  peace  must  be 
planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of  political  liberty." 
In  this  passage  the  President  has  asserted  for  himself  and 
the  Government  of  which  he  is  the  authorized  spokesman  two 
important  propositions:  The  first  is  that  sympathy  Avith 
democracy,  with  "government  of  the  people,  by  the  people, 
for  the  people,"  may  properly  be  expressed  not  only  in  the 
private  utterances  of  individual  Americans,  but  even  in  the 
official  and  public  utterances  of  our  Government ;  that  these 
democratic  ideals  of  the  American  people  may  properly  be 
taken  into  account  in  the  conduct  of  their  foreign  relations. 
The  second  principle  clearly  implied  is  that  this  associa- 
tion of  democracy  at  home  with  democracy  abroad  rests  not 
merely  upon  sentiment  but  upon  an  essential  element  of 
common  interest — a  common  interest  among  democracies  as 
such  for  mutual  protection  against  states  whose  authority 
is  secured  largely  by  military  force  in  the  hands  of  heredi- 
tary rulers.  With  the  increasing  interdependence  of  all  the 
nations  upon  each  other,  the  dominance  of  one  type  of 
government  or  the  other  is  a  matter  of  vital  concern  to  the 
world  at  large.  To  those  who  think  democracy  worth 
saving  in  America,  its  fate  in  Europe  or  Asia  can  no  longer 
be  an  indifferent  matter.  "The  world  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy. ' ' 

For  the  defense  of  these  principles,  the  American  people 
are  now  engaged  in  a  great  war  whose  demands  upon  us  no 
man  can   measure;   and  when   diplomacy  takes  the   place   of 

9S00°— 17 

(3) 


war  we  shall  have  new  problems  hardly  less  perplexing.  As 
we  assume  these  larger  responsibilities  we  may  naturally  ask, 
as  the  President  himself  has  done  in  his  Flag  Day  speech, 
whether  we  are  making  a  radical  departure  from  the  historic 
traditions  of  the  Republic,  or  whether  we  are  seeking  to 
secure  for  these  old  ideals  a  new  and  more  complete  realization. 
In  trying  to  answer  this  question  it  seems  best,  so  far  as  possible, 
to  let  the  fathers  speak  for  themselves. 

Going  back  to  the  first  days  of  the  Republic,  we  must 
remember  that  the  leaders  in  our  struggle  for  independence 
themselves  appealed  to  the  sympathy  of  European  liberals 
not  only  in  France  and  Holland  but  even  in  England  itself. 
That  is  an  outstanding  fact  in  the  correspondence  of  such 
men  as  Franklin  and  Adams,  who  represented  us  in  France 
and  the  Netherlands,  respectively.  There  is  no  question, 
either,  that  this  appeal  met  with  a  generous  response  and 
that  it  was  one  of  the  factors,  not  the  only  one,  of  course,  in 
bringing  about  that  French  alliance  which  finally  secured 
American  independence.  The  policies  of  the  French  minis- 
ters were,  indeed,  mainly  determined  by  considerations  of 
national  interest.  The  Seven  Years  "War  had  disturbed  the 
balance  of  European  power;  French  support  of  the  American 
rebels  would  weaken  England  and  restore  France  to  some- 
thing like  its  old  prestige.  But  the  French  court  was  not 
agreed  on  the  soundness  of  this  policy  and  in  the  delicate 
balance  of  official  opinions,  the  s^^npathy  of  liberal  French 
thinkers  unquestionably  helped  to  tip  the  scales  in  favor  of 
American  freedom.  Franklin  felt  this  so  keenly  that  he 
deprecated  the  appeals  frequently  made  to  the  French  on  the 
basis  of  their  economic  self-interest.  "This,"  he  wrote  to 
Livingston  in  1782,  "is  really  a  generous  Nation,  fond  of  glory, 
and  particularly  that  of  protecting  the  oppressed. '  '^ 

The  great  French  economist  and  statesman,  Turgot,  was 
not  in  favor  of  French  intervention,  but  shortly  after  the 
treaty  of  alliance  was  .■'igned  he  expressed  in  striking  lan- 
guage the  conviction  shared  by  many  forward-looking  Euro- 
peans that  the  significance  of  American  liberty  was  not  con- 
fined to  the  New  World.  The  American  people,  he  said,  "is 
the  hope  of  mankind.  It  must  show  to  the  world  by  its  ex- 
ample that  men  can  be  free  and  tranquil  and  can  do  without 
the  chains  that  tyrants  and  cheats  of  all  garbs  have  tried 
to  lay  on  them  under  pretense  of  public  good.  It  must  give 
the  example  of  political  liberty,  religious  liberty,  commercial 
and  industrial  liberty.  The  shelter  which  it  is  going  to 
offer  to  the  oppressed  of  all  nations  will  console  the  earth. 
The  ease  with  which  men  will  be  able  to  avail  themselves 
of  it  and  escape  the  effects  of  a  bad  government  will  oblige 

1  Franklin,  Writings  (Smyth  Ed.),  VIII,  301. 


governments  to  open  their  eves  and  to  be  just."-  Thus  Tur- 
got,  like  other  European  liberals,  thought  of  America  as  a 
laboratory  where  a  now  political  experiment  was  being 
worked  out  not  onlv  for  the  western  world  but  for  Europe  as 
well. 

A  few  years  later  this  idea  found  a  partial  realization  in 
the  great  French  Revolution,  many  of  whose  leaders,  espe- 
cially in  its  earlier  and  more  moderate  stages,  had  seen  service 
in  America.  The  first  attitude  of  most  Americans  was  one  of 
enthusiastic  sympathy  with  the  French  reformers,  but  as  the 
movement  became  more  violent  the  sympathies  of  our  people 
were  divided.  When  the  revolutionary  Republic  became 
involved  in  a  general  European  war  our  Government  adopted 
a  strictly  neutral  polic}^  and  ultimately  abrogated  the  old 
treatj^  of  alliance.  The  FareAvell  Address,  in  which  Wash- 
ington defended  this  policy,  is  frequently  but  not  always 
fairly  quoted.  It  is  not  usually  remembered,  for  instance, 
that  W^ashington  did  not  object  to  "temporary  alliances  for 
extraordinary  emergencies."-^  In  another  formal  public  ad- 
dress delivered  in  the  same  year,  he  expressed  his  o^\•n  sym- 
pathy and  that  of  the  American  people  with  the  cause  of 
popular  government  abroad.  In  accepting  from  the  French 
minister  the  colors  of  the  new  Republic  AVashington  spoke  of 
having  given  his  best  years  to  secure  the  establishment  of 
political  liberty  in  his  owti  country,  and  added:  "IMy  anxious 
recollections,  my  sympathetic  feelings,  and  my  best  wishes 
are  irresistibly  excited  whensoever,  in  any  country,  I  see  an 
oppressed  nation  unfurl  the  banners  of  freedom  *  *  *  . 
In  delivering  to  you  these  sentiments  I  express  not  my  own 
feelings  only  but  those  of  my  fellow  citizens  in  relation  to 
the  commencement,  the  progress,  and  the  issue  of  the  French 
Revolution."* 

The  unhappy  developments  of  the  next  few  years  disap- 
pointed the  hopes  of  democracy  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
The  ideals  of  republican  France  were  repressed  and  almost 
forgotten  in  the  ruthless  militarism  of  Napoleon.  Even 
Thomas  Jefferson,  the  most  ardent  friend  of  French  ralical- 
ism,  was  disillusioned — so  much  so  that  in  1802  his  adminis- 
tration was  ready  to  "marry"  the  "British  fleet  and 
nation,"  if  necessary  to  prevent  the  spread  of  imperialism 
to  the  New  World.  When,  in  defending  ourselves  against 
aggressions  on  neutral  rights,  we  finally  fought  with  Eng- 
land instead  of  France,  in  the  W^ar  of  1812,  we  did  so  not 
because  of  any  special  tenderness  for  Napoleon's  govern- 
ment, but  largely  because  the  dignitj^  of  American   citizen- 

*  Translation  in  Jusserand.  Americans  of  Past  and  Present  Day,  14. 
^American  State  Papt-rs,   I-'orcifju   Isolations.  I,  37. 

*  INIoore.  Digest  of  International  Law.  \l.  4.").  This  passage  was  (luoted  by 
Henry  Clay  in  his  speech  of  Mar.  L*4.  ISIS,  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
on  the  emancipation  of  the  South  American   States,  Works    (ed.   1904),   VI-142. 


ship  and  the  sanctity  of  human  life  seemed  to  us  then,  as 
they  do  now,  more  important  than  the  mere  infringement  of 
property  rights. 

The  War  of  1812  had  hardly  come  to  an  end  when  our 
interest  in  popular  government  received  a  new  test.  After 
the  fall  of  Napoleon  the  great  sovereigns  of  Europe  under- 
took to  organize  a  mutual  insurance  society  against  militant 
imperialism  on  the  one  side  and  revolutionary  idealism  on 
the  other.  The  most  consistent  defender  of  hereditary  au- 
tocracy was  the  Austrian  house  of  Hapsburg,  and  its  high 
priest  was  the  Austrian  minister.  Prince  j\Ietternich. 
Closely  associated  with  the  Hapsburgs,  then,  as  now,  was 
the  Prussian  house  of  Hohenzollern ;  then,  however,  the 
"great  headquarters"  of  the  combination  was  at  Vienna 
instead  of  Berlin.  For  15  years  after  Waterloo  the  people 
of  continental  Europe  lived  under  a  regime  of  Prussian- 
Austrian-Russian  military  autocracy,  which,  with  the  help 
of  a  most  elaborate  system  of  espionage,  threatened  to  stifle 
altogether  the  freer  spirit  of  the  revolutionary  era.  Popu- 
lar movements  in  the  German  States,  in  Spain  and  Portugal, 
and  in  the  Italian  States  were  ruthlessly  put  down  Avith  the 
help  of  foreign  troops.  So  far  as  the  Continent  of  Europe 
was  concerned,  the  system  of  ]\Ietternieh  and  his  associates 
seemed  to  be  effective. 

Europe  was  then  infinitely  farther  away  from  America 
than  it  is  now,  and  yet  not  too  far  away  to  escape  American 
interest.  President  Monroe's  annual  message  to  Congress  in 
1822  contained  several  references  to  popular  movements  in 
Europe.  He  did  not  propose  American  intervention;  indeed, 
any  such  right  of  intervention  was  specifically  rejected. 
Nevertheless,  the  President  did  not  hesitate  to  express  in 
unmistakable  language  American  sympathy  with  these  lib- 
eral movements.  He  mentioned  the  Greek  struggle  for  lib- 
erty against  the  Turks  with  special  enthusiasm  and  referred 
to  "that  great  excitement  and  s.ympathy  in  their  favor  which 
have  been  so  signally  displayed  throughout  the  United 
States."  The  message  also  touched  briefly  upon  the  reform 
movements  in  Spain  and  Portugal  and  praised  the  "extraor- 
dinary moderation"  with  which  they  had  been  conducted. 
IMonroe  went  on,  however,  to  express  his  anxiety  about  the 
"menacing  symptoms"  then  appearing  in  Europe.  If  a 
"convulsion"  should  take  place  there,  it  would  "proceed 
from  causes  which  have  no  existence  and  are  utterly  unknown 
in  these  States,  in  which  there  is  but  one  order,  that  of  the 
people  to  which  the  sovereignty  exclusively  belongs." 
Happy  as  the  American  people  were  in  their  isolation,  he 
feared  that  even  they  might  be  drawn  in  against  their  will 
by  some  act  of  aggression.^ 

5  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  193-195. 


On  these  ]ierplexing  subjects  Monroe  carried  on  an  active 
correspondence  with  his  two  predecessors — Jefferson  and 
IMadison.  Jefferson  believed  that  America  should  have  a 
separate  system  of  its  own,  but  he  was  willinpf  to  enter  into 
an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  which  would  "bring  her 
mighty  weight  into  the  scale  of  free  government"  and  so 
prevent  the  extension  of  the  European  system  to  the  New 
World.  Jefferson  had  in  mind  a  proposal  that  the  European 
alliance  should  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing 
the  revolutions  in  the  Spanish-American  colonies.  ^ladison 
WIS  less  cautious  than  Jefferson  about'  confining  American 
interest  to  the  Ncav  World.  The  British  (Government  hav- 
ing declared  its  disapproval  of  European  intervention  in 
South  America,  IMadison  asked  whether  it  might  not  be 
"honorable"  for  the  United  States  to  invite  Great  Britain 
to  extend  its  ''avowed  disapprobation"  to  the  action  of  the 
European  alliance  in  Spain,  and  even  to  join  in  some  expres- 
sions of  sympathy  for  the  Greeks.  Even  if  such  a  declara- 
tion should  lead  to  Avar  the  United  States  would  not  be  in 
serious  danger  in  view  of  the  British  power  on  the  sea. 
Madison  expressed  the  same  general  idea  in  a  letter  to  Jef- 
ferson:  "With  the  British  power  and  na\y  combined  with 
our  own  we  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of  the  world, 
and  in  the  great  struggle  of  the  epoch  between  liberty  and 
despotism  w^e  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  sustain  the  former  in 
this  hemisphere  at  least."'''  "^loni'oc  himself  evidently 
had  a  certain  amount  of  sympathy  with  these  suggestions  of 
]\Iadison's,  for  the  first  draft  of  his  famous  message  to  Con- 
gress contained,  according  to  John  Quincy  Adams,  an  ex- 
plicit condemnation  of  the  French  intervention  in  Spain 
and  a  "broad  acknowledgment  of  the  Greeks  as  an  inde- 
pendent nation."^  The  determined  opposition  of  his  Secre- 
tary of  State,  John  Quincy  Adams,  forced  him  to  confine 
his  annual  message  more  closely  to  American  affairs ;  but  it 
still  contained  a  strong  expression  of  sympathy  with  the 
aspirations  of  the  Greeks  for  independence.  There  was,  he 
said,  good  reason  to  suppose  "that  Greece  will  become  again 
an  independent  nation.  That  she  may  obtain  that  rank  is  the 
object  of  our  most  ardent  wishes."  * 

IMonroe's  sympathy  for  Greece  as  a  small  people  trying  to 
gain  liberty  and  self-government  was  shared  by  a  number  of 
prominent  public  men.  The  great  financier,  Albert  Gallatin,* 
proposed  that  vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy  should  co- 
operate with  the  Greeks,  and  when  the  matter  was  discussed 
in  the  President's  Cabinet  two  of  its  members,  Calhoun  and 
Crawford,    expressed   some   sympathy   with   the    idea.     Even 

8  This  corresponflence  of  Marlison  nn<\  Jefferson  Is  brought  together  in  Moore, 
Digest  of  IntornatioiKil  Law,  VI,  §  ^■\'^. 

'.T.  Q.  Adams.  Diarv.  VI.  104. 

"W.  C.  Ford  in  AmVrioan  Historical  Review,  VII,  670  ff. ;  VIII.  2S  ff . :  Mes- 
sages and  Papers,  II,  217. 


Adams  himself,  in  a  note  sent  to  the  Greek  agent  Luriottis, 
in  1823,  explaining  that  the  United  States  could  not  take  part 
in  the  war,  spoke  of  "cheering  with  their  best  wishes  the 
cause  of  the  Greeks. "  ^  In  Congress,  Daniel  "Webster  and 
Henry  Clay  were  in  favor  of  following  up  Monroe's  declara- 
tion of  sympathy  by  some  more  definite  action. 

In  January,  1824,  Webster  made  a  long  and  impassioned 
speech  in  support  of  a  resolution  authorizing  the  President 
to  appoint  a  commissioner  to  Greece,  with  the  avowed  pur- 
pose of  giving  congressional  indorsement  to  the  President's 
views. ^"^  He  maintained  that  such  an  expression  of  sym- 
pathy involved  no  essential  departure  from  the  established 
policy  of  the  United  States. 

That  policy,  "springing  from  the  nature  of  our  Government  and  the 
spirit  of  all  our  institutions,  is  so  far  as  it  respects  the  interesting 
questions  which  agitate  the  present  age,  on  the  side  of  liberal  and  en- 
lightened sentiments.  *  *  *  As  one  of  the  free  States  among  the 
nations,  as  a  great  and  rapidly  rising  Eepublic,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  us,  if  we  were  so  disposed,  to  prevent  our  principles,  our  senti- 
ments, and  our  example  from  producing  some  effect  upon  the  opinions 
and  hopes  of  society  throughout  the  civilized  world  *  *  *  the 
great  political  question  of  this  age  is  that  between  absolute  and  regu- 
lated Governments  *  *  *  whether  society  shall  have  any  part  in 
its  own  government  *  *  *  our  side  of  this  question  is  settled  for 
us  even  without  our  volition  *  *  *  our  place  is  on  the  side  of  free 
institutions. ' ' 

Webster  did  not  advocate  armed  intervention  by  the  United 
States  in  support  of  Greek  independence,  but  he  insisted 
that  such  moral  support  as  could  be  given  by  a  public  decla- 
ration ought  not  to  be  withheld.  Two  paragraphs  of  this 
speech  have  a  peculiar  interest  in  this  present  crisis  of  our 
history : 

It  may  now  be  required  of  me  to  show  what  interest  we  have  in  re- 
sisting this  new  system.  What  is  it  to  us,  it  may  be  asked,  upon 
what  principles  or  what  pretenses  the  European  Governments  assert 
a  right  of  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  their  neighbors?  The  thunder, 
it  may  be  said,  rolls  at  a  distance.  The  wide  Atlantic  is  between  us 
and  danger;   and,  however  others  may  suffer,  we  shall  remain  safe. 

I  think  it  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  this  to  say  that  we  are  one  of  the 
nations  of  the  earth ;  that  we  have  an  interest,  therefore,  in  the  pres- 
ervation of  that  system  of  national  law  and  national  intercourse 
which  h  s  heretofore  subsisted  so  beneficially  for  us  all.  *  «  * 
The  enterprising  character  of  the  age,  our  own  active,  commercial 
spirit,  the  great  increase  which  has  taken  place  in  the  intercourse 
among  civilized  and  commercial  States,  have  necessarily  connected  us 
'with  other  nations  and  given  us  a  high  concern  in  the  preservation  of 
those  salutary  principles  upon  which  that  intercourse  is  founded, 
We  have  as  clear  an  interest  in  international  law  as  individuals  have 
in  the  la>  s  of  society.^ 


^3.  Q.  Aflams,  Diary,  VI,  173,  108;  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, V,  257. 

^'  AVritings  and  Speeche.s  (Ed.  190."),  V,  Gl-ir..  Cf.  his  Private  Correspond- 
ence, ibid.,  XVII,  .328,  332,  .3.38. 

^'  Writings  and  Speeches  (Ed.  1003),  V,  75, 


Finally,  Webster  declared  that  this  expression  of  sympathy 
should  be  given  at  a  time  when  it  would  do  some  good.  "I  am 
not  of  those  who  would,  in  the  hour  of  national  peril,  withhold 
such  encouragement  as  might  be  properly  and  lawfully  given, 
and,  when  the  crisis  should  be  passed,  overwhelm  the  rescued 
sufferer  with  kindness  and  caresses." 

Webster's  resolution,  though  supported  by  the  eloquence 
of  Henry  Clay,  was  not  adopted,  but  it  doubtless  helped  to 
stimulate  interest  in  the  Greek  cause.  Some  Americans  en- 
listed in  the  revolutionary  army  and  funds  were  sent  over 
by  "Philhellenic"  committees.  European  liberals  w^ere  in- 
clined to  attach  some  significance  in  this  connection  to  the 
cruise  of  an  American  squadron  in  the  IMediterranean  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  John  Rodgers;  but,  though 
there  was  some  exchange  of  social  courtesies  between  Rodgers 
and  the  officials  of  the  Greek  revolutionary  government, 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  departure  from  the  rules  of 
neutrality.^-  American  interest  in  the  Greek  cause  was  suf- 
ficient to  bring  out  a  letter  of  thanks  from  the  President  of 
their  National  Assembly  to  President  John  Quincy  Adams, 
which  he  transmitted  to  Congress  with  his  annual  message  of 
1827.  In  this  letter  the  Greek  President  declared  that  "In 
extending  a  helping  hand  toward  the  Old  World  and  en- 
couraging it  in  its  march  toward  freedom  and  civilization, 
the  New  World  covers  itself  with  increased  glory  and  does 
honor  to  humanity.  "^^ 

The  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  Spanish- 
American  revolutions  was  the  outcome  of  various  motives, 
and  there  was  at  first  sharp  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
stand  which  the  Government  should  take.  Henry  Clay 
spoke  for  those  who  sympathized  most  strongly  with  the 
South  American  Republics.  He  suggested  the  possibility 
of  intervention  in  their  favor  as  early  as  1816,  and  in  the 
following  year  he  opposed  a  bill  to  prohibit  the  bviilcling  of 
ships  in  American  ports  for  the  Spanish-American  insiu'- 
gents.  In  some  of  his  most  impassioned  oratory  he  de- 
scribed "the  glorious  spectacle  of  18,000,000  of  people 
struggling  to  burst  their  chains  and  be  free."^*  The  com- 
paratively conservative  attitude  of  the  administration, 
guided  by  Secretary  Adams,  delayed  our  recognition  of  the 
South  American  Republics  until  1822,  when  it  had  become 
reasonably  sure  that  they  would  be  able  to  maintain  their 
independence  against  Spain.  After  their  independence  had 
been  recognized,  Claj^  and  Adams  were  as  one  in  opposing  any 
increase  of  European  interference  in  the  New  World.     When 

"Letters  of  Lafayette,  in  Clay,  Works  (od.  1904),  VI.  24.5;  in  Webster, 
Worlis.  XVIL  404.  408;  in  I^afayette,  INIemoires.  Correspondanee,  etc.,  VI. 
222,  22.">;  Cf.  I'aullin.  Connnodoie  .Tulin  llodjrers,  ch.  13;  Kichards,  Journals 
and  Letters  of  Samuel  Oridley  Howe.  I.  passim. 

1^  Ameriean  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  VI,  C27,  630,  037. 

"Clay,  Works  (ed.  1904),  VI,  90;  100  ff.,  140. 


10 

tlie  Russian  minister  read  to  Adams  a  note  extolling  the 
principles  of  the  European  system  of  intervention  against 
revolutionary  movements,  our  Secretary  drafted  in  reply  a 
statement  so  aggressive  in  its  defense  of  the  republican 
ideals  of  his  o\^ti  Government  that  INIonroe  asked  him  to 
"tone  it  dowTi  for  fear  of  giving  unnecessary  offense  to 
the  Russian  Czar.^^  In  one  passage,  which  was  struck  out 
of  this  rough  draft,  Adams  proposed  to  refer  to  ''the  great 
satisfaction  with  which  the  President  had  noticed  that  para- 
graph [of  the  Russian  note]  which  contains  the  frank  and 
solenm  admissions  that  the  undertaking  of  the  allies  [against 
liberalism  in  Portugal  and  Spain],  yet  demands  a  last  apol- 
ogy to  the  eyes  of  Europe. ' ' 

What  Adams  stood  out  for  in  1823  was  the  idea  of 
defending  the  western  world  from  European  aggression, 
and  that  was,  in  substance,  accepted  by  Monroe.  Un- 
doubtedly we  feared  the  possibility  of  European  conquests 
in  South  America  and  in  the  West  Indies;  but  the  great 
message  of  December,  1823,  the  starting  point,  if  not  the 
complete  expression,  of  our  present  Monroe  doctrine,  is 
charged  through  and  through  with  the  idea  that  the  fimda- 
mental  difference  between  American  policy  and  that  of  the 
continental  powers  of  Europe  resulted  from  the  nature  of 
their  political  institutions:  "The  political  system  of  the 
allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that 
of  America.  This  difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists 
in  their  respective  Governments";  therefore  "we  should 
consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to 
any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety.  "^'■'  In  short,  the  American  Government  of  1823, 
before  the  days  of  the  steamship  and  the  ocean  cable — not 
to  speak  of  the  wireless  telegraph,  the  submarine,  and  the 
airship — at  a  time  when  America  seemed  a  world  by  itself, 
thought  it  sufficient  to  say  that  the  Western  Hemisphere 
must  be  made  safe  for  democracy. 

Seven  years  after  the  ]\Ionroe  doctrine  was  promulgated 
the  European  revolution  of  1830  materially  weakened  the 
autocratic  governments  against  Avhich  that  doctrine  was 
directed;  but  a  still  greater  upheaval  came  in  the  "earth- 
quake year"  of  1848.  France  returned  for  a  time  to  re- 
publican government,  and  German  liberals  joined  in  a  prom- 
ising movement  which  seemed  likely  to  transform,  if  not 
to  overthrow,  the  divine-right  monarchies  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin.  These  hopes  were  for  the  most  part  doomed  to 
disappointment,  and  America  became  the  refuge  of  those 
German  lil)erals  who  preferred  liberty  in  a  new  home  to 
autocratic  militarism  in  the  old.    Again   Americans  listened 

"W.  C.  Ford  in  American  Historiciil   Review,  VIII,   28-46. 
"  Mess.ages  .and  P.ipers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  217-219. 


11 

with  the  keenest  interest  to  the  great  debate  between  abso- 
lute and  "regulated"'  government,  between  the  advoeatcs 
of  ultimate  control  by  the  people  and  those  who,  as  Webster 
said,  believed  "that  all  popular  or  constitutional  rights  are  held 
no  otherwise  than  as  grants  from  the  crown." 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the  United  States  for 
that  period  shows  that  these  popular  movements  in  Germany 
were  given  careful  attention  by  our  Government.  The  re- 
ports of  Mr.  Donelson,  our  minister  in  Berlin,  described  the 
progress  of  the  movement  to  liberalize  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment, then  entirely  without  a  constitution,  and  referred  to 
the  interest  shown  by  the  popular  leaders  in  the  Federal  and 
State  Constitutions  of  the  United  States.  Finally,  when 
representatives  from  the  various  German  States  met  at 
Frankfort  to  organize  a  new  federal  government,  based  on 
the  authority  of  the  German  people  rather  than  of  the  reign- 
ing princes,  Mr.  Donelson  was  authorized  by  the  President 
"to  proceed  to  Frankfort  and  there,  as  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States,  recognize  the  provisional 
government  of  the  new  German  confederation ;  provided, 
you  shall  find  such  a  government  in  successful  operation." 
These  instructions  were  issued  on  July  24,  1848;  and  in 
August  of  that  year  Donelson  was  appointed  envoy  extraordi- 
nary and  minister  plenipotentiary  to  the  Frankfort  Govern- 
ment. In  March,  1849,  Zachary  Taylor  became  President,  and 
his  Secretary  of  State,  ]\Ir.  Clayton,  took  up  the  correspondence 
with  Donelson  at  Frankfort.^ ^ 

Donelson 's  instructions  of  July  8,  1849  discuss  the  German 
situation  at  length  and,  though  urging  the  importance  of 
great  caution  on  the  part  of  our  representatives  abroad  and 
disavowing  in  particular  any  intention  of  intervening  be- 
tween the  liberal  and  reactionary  elements,  nevertheless 
emphasize  the  sympathy  of  the  United  States  with  the 
popular  movement.  Donelson  was  informed  that  his  mission 
to  Frankfort  "originated  in  the  strong  desire  of  this  Gov- 
ernment to  manifest  a  proper  degree  of  sympathy  for  the 
efforts  of  the  German  people  to  ameliorate  their  condition, 
by  the  adoption  of  a  form  of  government  which  should 
secure  their  liberties  and  promote  their  happiness."  It  was 
the  cordial  desire  of  the  United  States  that  a  constitution 
might  be  established  "for  all  Germany,  which  will  render 
the  nation  great  and  powerful,  and  will  secure  to  every 
German  citizen  the  blessings  of  liberty  and  order. 
Should  either  a  republican  form  of  government,  or  that  of 
a  limited  monarchy  (founded  on  a  popular  and  permanent 
basis),  be  adopted  by  any  of  the  States  of  Germany,  we  are 
bound  to  be  the  first,  if  possible,  to  hail  the  birth  of  the  new 

"Ms.  "Prnsaian  instructions"  in  the  archives  of  tlie  Department  of  State; 
Buchanan,  Writings,  III,  130,  152,  167,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc,  31st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  1, 


12 

government,  and  to  cheer  it,  in  every  progressive  movement 
that  has  for  its  aim  the  attainment  of  the  priceless  and  count- 
less blessings  of  freedom."  The  following  passage  is  worth 
quoting  as  illustrating  the  official  American  view  of  the  funda- 
mental issues  at  stake : 

From  what  intelligence  we  have  been  enabled  to  gather  on  this  side 
of  the  Atlantic  we  understand  that  there  are,  at  this  time,  two  parties 
in  Germany,  each  seeking  to  establish  a  constitution  for  a  Germanic 
Empire ;  and  that  the  essential  difference  between  them  consists  in 
this — that  one  of  them  desires  to  form  a  constitution,  which  has  for 
its  basis  a  recognition  of  the  principle  that  the  people  are  the  true 
source  of  all  power;  and  the  other,  a  constitution  based  on  the 
despotic  principle  that  kings  hold  their  power  by  divine  right,  and 
that  the  constitutions  to  be  established  under  their  auspices  are 
boons  granted  to  the  people,  by  thera,  as  the  only  legitimate  sources 
of  power.  It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  say  to  you  that  all  the 
sympathies  of  the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  are 
with  the  former  i^arty.is 

Americans  learned  of  these  things  not  merely  by  reading 
the  papers  but  from  the  lips  of  political  exiles  who  found  a 
refuge  in  America.  Republican  idealists  from  Germany  like 
Carl  Schurz,  Friedrich  Hecker,  and  Franz  Sigel  found 
here  a  sympathetic  hearing  and  gave  to  their  adopted 
country  that  spirit  of  free  loyalty  which  was  discouraged 
in  their  old  home.  From  Hungary,  struggling  to  establish  its 
independence  of  the  Hapsburg  d\Tiasty,  came  the  ardent  revo- 
lutionist, Louis  Kossuth. 

Kossuth  w^as  a  man  of  picturesque  personality,  and  the 
Hungarian  revolt  made  a  strong  appeal  to  American  sympa- 
thies, which  found  expression  even  in  the  official  utterances 
of  our  leaders.  The  administration  of  President  Taylor 
showed  its  interest  in  the  Hungarian  revolution  by  appoint- 
ing a  special  agent,  with  authority  to  recognize  the  independ- 
ence of  the  new  State  "promptly,"  "in  the  event  of  her  abil- 
ity to  sustain  it. ' '  The  language  used  in  the  instruction  of  this 
agent,  which  later  became  public,  was  strongly  resented  by  the 
Austrian  Government  because  Hungary  was  described  as  "a 
great  people  rising  superior  to  the  enormous  oppression" 
that  had  "so  long  weighed  her  do^\Ti."  In  his  annual  mes- 
sage of  1849,  President  Taylor  declared  that  he  had  thought 
it  his  duty,  "in  accordance  with  the  general  sentiment  of  the 
American  people,  who  deeply  sympathized  with  the  ]\Iagyar 
patriots,  to  stand  prepared,  upon  the  contingency  of  the 
establishment  by  her  of  a  permanent  government,  to  be  the 
first  to  welcome  independent  Hungary  into  the  family  of 
nations."  The  hopes  of  Hungary  had,  he  said,  been  de- 
feated through  the  intervention  of  Russia,  and  the  American 
Government  had  not  interfered  in  the  contest ;  but  ' '  the 
feelings    of   the    [American]    Nation    were    strongly   enlisted 

^*  Ms.  "Prussian  m.structions"  in  the  archives  of  the  Department  of  State. 


13 

in  the  cause,  and  by  the  sufferings  of  a  brave  people,  who  had 
made  a  gallant  though  unsuccessful  effort  to  be  free."^^ 

After  the  collapse  of  the  Hungarian  revolution,  Congress 
passed  a  joint  resolution,  approved  by  President  Fillmore, 
March  3,  1851,  declaring  that  "the  people  of  the  United  States 
sincerely  sympathize  with  the  Hungarian  exiles,  Kossuth  and 
his  associates,"  and  concluding  as  follows: 

Besolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Eepresentativcs  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  Prosideut  of  the 
United  States  be,  and  hereby  is,  requested  to  authorize  the  employ- 
ment of  some  of  the  public  vessels  which  may  be  noW  cruising  in  the 
Mediterranean  to  receive  and  convey  to  the  said  United  States  the 
said  Louis  Kossuth  and  his  associates  in  captivity. 

An  American  ship  was  accordingly  sent  to  bring  the 
exiles  from  Turkey.  On  his  arrival  in  Washington,  Kos- 
suth was  formally  received  by  the  President  and  by  both 
Houses  of  Congress,  and  was  the  guest  of  honor  at  a  con- 
gressional dinner  presided  over  by  the  President  of  the 
Senate.^" 

Against  all  this  official  and  semiofficial  recognition  of  a 
revolutionary  leader  the  Austrian  Government  protested 
through  its  charge  d 'affairs  in  Washington.  To  this  pro- 
test Webster,  then  Secretary  of  State,  made  a  vigorous  reply 
in  the  so-called  Hiilsemann  letter,  which  went  somewhat 
beyond  the  bounds  of  conventional  diplomacy  and  has  since 
been  severely  criticized.  It  is  nevertheless  interesting  be- 
cause it  contains  another  emphatic  expression  of  American 
interest  in  popular  government  abroad.  The  United  States, 
Webster  declared,  would  not  take  a  direct  part  in  the  strug- 
gles of  foreign  peoples  for  constitutional  government. 
"But,"  he  continued,  "when  the  United  States  behold  the 
people  of  foreign  countries  without  any  such  interference 
spontaneously  moving  toward  the  adoption  of  institutions 
like  their  own,  it  surely  can  not  be  expected  of  them  to 
remain  wholly  indifferent  spectators."  Not  only  the  Ameri- 
can people  but  their  Government  had,  he  declared,  the  right 
to  express  their  o^vn  opinions  "upon  the  great  political 
events  which  may  transpire  among  the  civilized  nations  of 
the  earth.  "-1 

Webster's  ardent  defense  of  American  political  ideals  was 
doubtless  influenced  by  his  desire  to  stimulate  patriotism 
and  so  check  the  rising  tide  of  sectional  feeling  which  had 
developed  out  of  the  slavery  controversy.  A  few  years  later, 
the  Government  whose  principles  AVebster  had  so  eloquently 
expounded  was  fighting  for  its  own  existence,  and  obliged  to 
look  on  helplessly  while  the  same  Napoleon  who  had  over- 
throwTi  the  second  French  Republic  proceeded  to  set  up  a 
vassal   monarchy   in   IMexico   with   an   Austrian   prince   at   its 

"Moore.  Digest,  International  Law,  I.  §  72. 

2"  Ibid.,  Vt.   §  90.5;  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large.  IX,  G47. 

"  Moore,  Digest,  International  Law,  I,  §  72. 


14 

head.  Once  more,  as  in  the  days  of  our  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, a  leader  of  American  democracy  appealed  to  Euro- 
pean liberals  for  their  sympathy  and  moral  support.  In  his 
great  message  of  July  4,  1861,  Lincohi  declared  that  the  war 
for  the  Union  was  essentially  a  "people's  contest."  "This 
issue,"  he  said,  "embraces  more  than  the  fate  of  these  United 
States.  It  presents  to  the  whole  family  of  man  the  question 
whether  a  constitutional  republic  or  democracy — a  government 
of  the  people  by  the  same  people — can  or  can  not  maintain  its 
territorial  integrity  against  its  own  domestic  foes."^^ 

In  1863,  after  the  emancipation  proclamation,  Lincoln  was 
able  to  make  a  still  stronger  appeal  to  European  liberals,  and 
this  appeal  met  with  a  hearty  response,  especially  from  the 
"plain  people"  of  England.  In  one  of  the  most  notable  let- 
ters he  ever  wrote,  he  acknowledged  a  sympathetic  address 
from  the  workingmen  of  London  and  thanked  them  for  the 
"exalted  and  humane  sentiments  by  which  it  was  inspired. "^^ 
He  went  on  to  declare  his  faith  in  the  community  of  democratic 
interests  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic : 

As  these  sentiments  are  manifestly  the  enduring  support  of  the  free 
institutions  of  England,  so  I  am  sure  also  that  they  constitute  the  only 
reliable  basis  for  free  institutions  throughout  the  world. 

The  resources,  advantages,  and  powers  of  the  American  people  are 
very  great,  and  they  have  consequently  succeeded  to  equally  great 
responsibilities. 

It  seems  to  have  devolved  upon  them  to  test  whether  a  government 
established  on  the  principles  of  human  freedom  can  be  maintained 
against  an  effort  to  build  one  upon  the  exclusive  foundation  of  human 
bondage.  They  will  rejoice  with  me  in  the  new  evidences  which  your 
proceedings  furnish  that  the  magnanimity  they  are  exhibiting  is  justly 
estimated  by  the  true  friends  of  freedom  and  humanity  in  foreign 
countries. 

At  a  time  when  a  strong  section  of  the  English  ruling  class 
were  ready  to  recognize  the  Southern  Confederacy  and  so 
prevent  the  restoration  of  the  LTnion,  the  ability  of  the 
British  workingmen  to  recognize  this  solidarity  of  democratic 
interests  was  a  political  fact  of  great  importance. 

The  closing  years  of  this  warlike  decade  brought  some 
notable  victories  for  democracy  in  both  hemispheres,  despite 
the  military  methods  which  made  Prussia  a  world  power. 
The  Federal  Republic  of  the  LTnited  States  was  saved  from 
disintegration  and  established  on  a  more  democratic  basis. 
Under  pressure  from  the  United  States  Napoleon  III  with- 
drew his  troops  from  INIexico  in  1867,  and  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment which  he  had  set  up  there  collapsed  at  once.  Three 
years  later  Napoleon's  Empire  at  home  also  broke  down  under 
the  stress  of  war  and  the  third  French  Republic  was  estab- 
lished.   This  was  also  a  victorious  time  for  the  British   de- 

22  Works  (Nicolav  and  Hav  ed.  1S94),  II.  57.  ~>S,  04. 

23  Works  (Nlpolay  and  Play  ed.  1S94).  II,  .".OS,  .'',00.  See  also  a  similar  let- 
ter to  the  workingmen  of  Manchester.    Ibid.,  301-302. 


15  AA    000  637  992    9 

moeraey.  In  1867  the  voting  privilege  was  given  for  the  first 
time  to  a  large  section  of  the  working  classes  in  the  industrial 
centers  of  England  and  in  the  same  year  Canada  secured  a 
ncAV  constitution  with  almost  complete  freedom  for  the  man- 
agenient  of  her  own  affairs.  And  with  all  these  changes  came 
a  better  understanding  between  the  United  States  and  the  two 
great  liberal  States  of  western  Europe. 

The  reestablishment  of  the  French  Republic  gave  the 
United  States  an  opportunity  to  illustrate  one  of  the  inter- 
esting traditions  of  our  di[)lomacy,  namely,  that  of  giving 
prompt  recognition  to  a  new  republican  government. 
Twenty-two  years  before,  in  1848,  the  American  minister  in 
Paris  was  the  first  to  recognize  the  second  French  Republic, 
and  our  Secretary  of  State,  approving  this  step,  declared 
that  if  he  had  allowed  the  representative  of  any  other  nation 
to  precede  him  "in  this  good  work  it  would  have  been 
regretted  by  the  President."  When  Napoleon  III  over- 
threw this  republican  government  our  minister  refused  for  a 
time  to  attend  his  weekly  receptions,  because  he  did  not 
wish  to  give  sanction  to  a  step  by  which  the  safeguards  of 
civil  and  political  liberty  had  been  "trodden  underfoot." 

In  1870,  when  the  present  republic  was  founded,  the  trans- 
Atlantic  cable  was  already  in  operation,  and  in  accordance 
with  telegraphic  instructions  from  President  Grant,  the 
American  minister  w^as  again  the  first  to  recognize  it  and 
extend  congratulations  to  the  French  people  on  establishing 
a  government  "disconnected  with  the  dynastic  traditions  of 
Europe. ' '  -*  When,  therefore,  during  the  past  year  our  Gov- 
ernment took  the  lead  in  recognizing  the  Republic  of  Russia  it 
was  following  definite  American  precedents. 

A  study  of  this  record  clearly  establishes  two  features 
of  American  policy  during  the  life  of  our  Republic :  First, 
that  the  traditional  sympathj^  of  the  American  people  with 
popular  government  abroad  has  repeatedly  been  declared 
in  the  public  utterances  of  our  official  representatives.  We 
have  not  felt  bound  to  suppress  even  in  the  formal  docu- 
ments of  our  Government  our  inveterate  prejudice  in  favor 
of  free  institutions  and  our  sense  of  the  essential  unity  of 
the  cause  of  liberalism  and  self-government  throughout  the 
world.  Secondly,  we  have  declared  with  special  emphasis 
not  only  our  sympathy  with,  but  our  practical  interest  in, 
the  defense  of  other  American  republics  against  efforts  to 
extend  the  European  system  to  this  hemisphere.  We  have 
done  this,  partly  at  least,  on  the  ground  that  there  was  a 
difference  between  our  system  and  that  of  Europe,  resulting 
from  the  difference  in  our  political  institutions;  that  States 
foulided  upon  liberal  or  democratic  institutions  have  a  com- 


^*  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  §  43 


16 

mon  interest  as  against  those  which  are  based  upon  dynastic 
and  reactionary  principles. 

Until  recently  we  have  limited  our  actual  intervention  in 
defense  of  these  principles  to  the  American  hemisphere.  As 
j\Ir.  Olney  said  in  his  famous  note  to  Lord  Salisbury  during 
the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute  of  1895,  we  have  desired  to 
keep  free  from  the  system  which  has  converted  Europe  into  a 
group  of  armed  camps.  We  have  believed  in  the  possibility 
of  American  isolation  from  the  dominant  forces  of  the  Old 
World.  During  the  last  quarter  century,  however,  the  world 
has  undergone  enormous  changes.  The  great  military  power 
which  has  threatened  to  dominate  Europe  has  extended  its 
formidable  s.ystem  of  espionage  to  the  New  World;  it  has  at- 
tempted to  draw  one  of  our  Latin- American  neighbors  into  a 
conspiracy  against  our  territory;  its  submarines  have  at- 
tacked American  commerce  within  a  few  miles  of  our  coast. 
To  the  ocean  steamship  and  the  ocean  cable  have  now  been 
added  the  airship  and  the  Avireless  telegraph.  It  is  these 
hard  facts  which  have  put  an  end  to  the  "splendid  isolation" 
of  our  earlier  days.  It  is  only  in  a  world  made  safe  for  democ- 
racy that  America  herself  can  be  safe  and  free. 


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